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DELAWARE AS DEMON: TWENTY-FIVE




Twenty-five years ago Professor William L. Cary of the
Columbia Law School published an article entitled Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware' in the Yale
Law Journal. Cary's prominence as a professor and former
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
and the article's placement in the Yale Law Journal, assured
that legal scholars and practitioners would take note of it. The
article's controversial thesis assured its notoriety.2 Professor
Cary theorized that, to garner incorporation and corporate
franchise fees, the State of Delaware had developed a public
policy of appealing to businesses to incorporate or reincorporate
in Delaware.' To implement this policy, Cary said that Dela-
ware would sacrifice shareholder protections in favor of pro-
management statutory provisions and judicial decisions.4
Cary noted that, of the 1,505 companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange in January 1973, 606 of them, or forty
percent, had incorporated in Delaware.5 The dominance of
This article is based on the 1999 Austin W. Scott, Jr. Lecture, entitled
"Lessons from the Race Debate: A Talk About Corporate Law," delivered by the
author at the University of Colorado School of Law on April 22, 1999. References
to the passage of time, such as the one in the first sentence, refer to the date of
the lecture. The author thanks Jennifer Peters for her research assistance and
his colleague, Dale Oesterle, for his helpful comments.
1. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
2. Indeed, Cary's article is among the most cited law review articles, ranking
14th among those published in the Yale Law Journal. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-
Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 (1991).
3. See Cary, supra note 1, at 664-65.
4. See id.
5. See Cary, supra note 1, at 671.
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Delaware in this peculiar market has continued to the present,
and probably has increased. The Delaware Division of Corpo-
rations reports on its web site that sixty percent of the Fortune
500 companies and fifty percent of the companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange have incorporated in Delaware.6
Long before Cary's article appeared, commentators explained
Delaware's prominence on the basis that Delaware provided
corporations with a "favorable forum" for incorporation-a
modern statute that made the process of incorporation rela-
tively simple and made the governance of the corporation rela-
tively free from governmental restrictions.7 Cary added a few
nuances to this explanation. He argued that the revenue from
initial incorporations and annual franchise fees was so signifi-
cant to the State of Delaware that maintaining its position as a
provider of corporate charters had become an economic neces-
sity. In this regard, he noted corporation services generated
roughly twenty-five percent of the state's revenue.
8
To maintain its preeminence, Cary argued, the Delaware
legislature and courts act in concert to provide a comprehen-
sive law that is pro-management, because corporate managers
decide where to incorporate initially and whether to reincorpo-
rate To Cary, the interests of corporate managers and share-
holders are in hopeless conflict; if the law favors corporate
managers, it must thereby disadvantage corporate sharehold-
ers. 10 One of the few examples of pro-management statutory
provisions that Cary provided was Delaware's indemnification
provisions for officers and directors. Comparing Delaware's
provisions to the comparable provisions in New York, Cary ob-
served that the Delaware provisions were broader." Left un-
said was the presumed conclusion: indemnification provisions
as broad as Delaware's advantage corporate managers at the
expense of shareholders.
The heart of Cary's article, however, consisted of a review
of several Delaware court decisions, which he believed demon-
6. See Delaware Division of Corporations (last modified Aug. 26, 1999)
<http'/www.state.de.us/corp/index.htm>.
7. See, e.g., Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation
Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969) [hereinafter Law for Sale].
8. See Cary, supra note 1, at 668-69.
9. See id. at 665-70.
10. See id at 669-72.
11. See id. at 669-70 & n.54.
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strated the pro-management bias of the Delaware courts.'2 He
contrasted these decisions to decisions of the federal courts,
which, he believed, construed federal law in a more even-
handed fashion.'" Finally, Cary theorized if any other state of-
fered a law that might attract the interest of corporate manag-
ers, Delaware would adjust its statutory law to meet the com-
petition. 14 This possibility would lead to a "race to the bottom,"
in which states would compete with one another to provide the
most attractive pro-management law.'" To avoid this competi-
tion, and the resulting harm to America's shareholders, Cary
recommended that the federal government intercede by creat-
ing minimum safeguards for corporate shareholders. 6
Professor Cary's article received a generally warm recep-
tion, particularly among legal academics who shared Cary's
skepticism of Delaware law and the manner in which Delaware
law has evolved.'7 Cary's work was not without its detractors,
however, who were led by then Professor, and now Federal
Court of Appeals Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr. In an article enti-
tled State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation," which appeared in 1977 in the Journal of Legal
Studies, Judge Winter was outspoken in his disagreement with
Cary's thesis. While Winter agreed that the states competed to
attract corporate chartering, he rejected the notion that this
12. See id. at 670-84.
13. See id. at 692-96.
14. See id. at 663-66 (describing competition among states to attract incor-
porations).
15. See id. at 705.
16. See id. at 696-703.
17. See generally RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); Christopher J. Bebel, Why the Approach of Heckmann v. Ahmanson Will
Not Become the Prevailing Greenmail Viewpoint: Race to the Bottom Continues, 18
TEX. TECH L. REv. 1083 (1987); Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corpora-
tion Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991 (1976); Stanley A. Kaplan,
Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 883
(1976); Charles W. Murdock, Delaware: The Race to the Bottom-Is an End in
Sight?, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 643 (1978); Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Mini-
mum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947 (1990); see also Joel F. Hen-
ning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Linda C. Quinn, Federal Chartering of
Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972) (illustrating the skepticism pre-
dating the Cary article).
18. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
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competition constituted a race to the bottom."9 To the contrary,
Winter argued, this competition would lead to corporate laws
that would favor rather than disadvantage shareholders."
Over time, Winter believed, the best, not the worst, corporate
law would emerge.2
Winter theorized that corporate managers have a powerful
incentive to choose a state of incorporation that meets with the
approval of the potential investors in the company.22 If inves-
tors perceive a state's law as being hostile to their interests,
they will discount their investment in a company accordingly.23
Relying on the efficient market hypothesis, Winter argued that
investors will factor in the underlying corporate law like any
other information relating to the investment.24 If the law is un-
favorable, investors will pay less for the stock. Winter argued
that corporate managers who choose a governing law for the
corporation that investors view unfavorably will be punished
for their decision. They will face a higher cost of capital than
their competitors who choose a more investor-friendly law.25
Companies with a higher cost of capital will have difficulty
competing in the product markets, as capital is a cost, like any
other cost, in producing a good or service. That higher cost of
capital, in turn, will lead to lower profit margins, lower earn-
ings, and lower share prices.
Winter believed that this scenario-a higher cost of capital
leading to lower earnings, and, consequentially, lower share
prices-would ultimately harm corporate managers who chose
the bad law in the first place, because a company whose stock
price is low provides an inviting target for a hostile takeover.26
In theory, an entrepreneur could purchase the company, or a
controlling interest in it, and then reincorporate the company
in a more shareholder-friendly jurisdiction.2" This move would
lower the cost of capital, allowing the company to compete more
effectively and raising its value.
19. See id. at 254-62.
20. See id. at 256.
21. See id. at 289-92.
22. See id. at 256-58.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 257.




In short, Winter argued that managers will select a corpo-
rate law that appeals to investors because they want to entice
investment. If investors view Delaware law unfavorably, they
will shun investments in Delaware corporations, to the disad-
vantage of managers seeking those investments. If states want
to attract incorporations, they will have to provide economically
efficient laws. Winter did not discuss the statutory provisions
or judicial precedent that persuaded Cary of Delaware's pro-
management bias. He might have said, however, that inves-
tors, not law professors, are best able to decide what is in
shareholders' best interests.
The Cary/Winter debate about whether corporate laws
evolve as a race to the bottom or to the top poses an attractive
but incomplete choice of theories to explain the content of cor-
porate law in America today.28 The twenty-five years that have
passed since the appearance of Cary's article have not borne
out his dire predictions of the progress of Delaware law. That
law has not moved inexorably in favor of managers, and to the
detriment of the interests of shareholders. Moreover, the basic
premise of Cary's and Winter's theses is suspect--states do not
compete with one another to attract corporate charters, at least
not to the degree that Cary and Winter assumed. States do
not, therefore, draft or amend their corporate laws merely to at-
tract new incorporations any more than they amend their
partnership laws to provide incentives to form partnerships
28. To be sure, Cary and Winter are not the only scholars who have explored
this question. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER & KENNETH SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATION AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1980) (claiming states offer different
codes to attract corporations with various needs); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N.
Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. REV.
179 (1985) (finding states draft their corporate codes to match the needs of corpo-
rations with varying share ownership patterns); Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (arguing
Delaware's preeminence is attributable to "network externalities;" that is, the
large number of Delaware corporations provides an incentive for others to incor-
porate there); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOzO L. REV. 709 (1987) (maintaining transaction cost analysis explains
where firms incorporate or reincorporate). See also Peter Dodd & Richard Left-
wich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal
Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980) (concluding, on the basis of empirical research,
that investors are not harmed when corporations reincorporate in Delaware, sug-
gesting that the competition among the states for incorporation business is not a
'race to the bottom"). Each of these theories proceeds from the assumption that
state legislatures are motivated to attract at least a portion of the market for cor-
porate charters and, to that extent, these theses are challenged in this article.
2000]
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under their laws, nor should they. Because states do not com-
pete to the extent that Cary and Winter assumed, they gener-
ally do not fashion their "product"--that is, the corporate
code-to appeal to the "consumers" of that product, corporate
promoters and managers. Rather, legislators' perception of
public policy is an important and overlooked factor explaining
corporate law.
In challenging both Cary and Winter, Part I of this article
discusses the premise that underlies both theories, that states
compete for corporate charters. Although it is the accepted
wisdom that states do compete,29 the supporting evidence is
unpersuasive. The article will then move to what the last
twenty-five years have taught us about the "race debate," fo-
cusing in Part II on Professor Cary's and Judge Winter's the-
ses. This Part also considers the increasingly important role
played by stock exchanges in standardizing corporate law for
publicly-held corporations. Part III considers the evolution of
corporate democracy which, like the role of the stock ex-
changes, was not considered either by Cary or Winter. Part IV
concludes with some observations on the role of state legisla-
tures in the development of corporate law, and emphasizes the
importance of providing protections in the corporate code for
shareholders against abuses by officers and directors.
I. THE COMPETITION FOR CHARTERS
Both Cary and Winter simply assumed that states compete
with one another to attract promoters to choose their state in
which to incorporate. If the law of State A is succeeding in the
competition, presumably the legislatures of other states will
amend their codes and close the gap. Cary and Winter both
suggested that this competition will take place for fiscal rea-
sons-states can make money by being the jurisdiction of in-
29. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-40 (1991) (hereinafter, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984). See generally ROBERTA




corporation."0 Both Cary and Winter quoted language from a
New Jersey law revision committee that said that states cannot
protect investors, creditors, employees, customers, or the gen-
eral public through their state corporation laws because doing
so would, in the committee's words, "drive corporations out of
the state to more hospitable jurisdictions."3' Neither Cary nor
Winter commented on this language, as each assumed that it
proves the presence of competitive pressures. Some comment,
however, is in order.
First, corporate law does not drive corporations anywhere.
Corporations can choose the state in which they wish to incor-
porate and the state in which they wish to do business. The
two need not be the same. Businesses choose where they oper-
ate based on factors such as the availability of labor and other
inputs of production, tax laws, and proximity to markets, not
on the basis of the state's corporate laws. Aside from Dela-
ware, attracting and retaining operations is far more important
to a state's economy than being the state that issues the corpo-
rate charter.
Second, state corporate laws typically do not regulate cor-
porate conduct to protect investors, creditors, employees, cus-
tomers, or the general public. Many other state laws, however,
do. State securities laws protect investors, commercial laws
protect creditors, environmental and public safety laws protect
the general public, and so forth. To the extent that we look to
state corporate laws to protect any discreet constituency, the
concern is with the relationship between corporate sharehold-
ers and corporate managers. While this is of obvious concern to
shareholders, the broader public impact is limited.
If state corporate laws do not influence where a corpora-
tion operates, and do not have the impact that the New Jersey
law revision committee attributes to them, then one might rea-
sonably ask why the committee suggested otherwise. This
question leads to a third observation. Corporate lawyers do
have an interest in the content of state corporate law. In the
course of discharging their professional obligations, corporate
lawyers at times advise promoters and corporate managers
30. See Cary, supra note 1, at 669 ("For revenue reasons, 'creating a favor-
able climate' is declared to be public policy of the state."); Winter, supra note 18,
at 253.
31. Cary, supra note 1, at 666; Winter, supra note 18, at 255 n.14.; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A, xi (West 1969).
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about where to incorporate or whether to reincorporate. The
corporate lawyers of a state have a primary responsibility for
advising the state legislature on statutory law, and have an in-
terest in a corporate statute that is attractive to their clients,
who tend to be promoters and corporate managers. The law-
yer-lobbyist's interest is, however, a narrow one. Having a
"modern" corporate code is primarily a matter of convenience
and pride. As to convenience, the lawyer need only track the
changes to the law of his or her state if the lawyer's clients are
incorporated in the state. As to pride, lawyers who practice in
a specialized area, such as corporate law, and who have some
influence on the content of that law, can reasonably be ex-
pected to take some pride in that law.32
What is not at stake, ironically, is the economic self-
interest of the lawyer, at least for lawyers outside of the state
of Delaware.33 A non-Delaware lawyer can just as easily form a
corporation under Delaware law as under the law of his or her
state. With fax and electronic filings, it does not matter where
the office of the Secretary of State, where one typically files
corporate documents, is located. Ironically, it is easier for most
non-Delaware lawyers to form a Delaware corporation than it
is for them to form a corporation under the laws of the state in
which they live. This is because the Secretary of State of
Delaware is quite customer-friendly-for instance, boasting a
"two-hour" processing time.
34
By contrast, Delaware lawyers do have an interest in
making their law attractive to corporate managers, because the
32. The author served as a member of the Colorado Bar Association commit-
tee that recommended the adoption of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act (with a number of modifications) to the state legislature in 1993. While broad
competitive arguments were made to the legislature, many of the lawyers on the
committee were motivated to work on the legislation and support its adoption so
that Colorado would have a modern law, without regard to its fiscal consequences.
There were no indications that Colorado businesses were choosing to incorporate,
much less do business, elsewhere because of concerns over the Colorado corporate
code.
33. Delaware lawyers benefit from the large number of incorporations in the
state and thus may have an economic motivation to influence the content of the
Delaware corporate code. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward
an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987)
(explaining the content of Delaware law partially on the basis of the interests of
the Delaware corporate bar).
34. See Delaware Division of Corporations, Frequently Asked Questions (last
modified Jan. 1, 1999) <http://www.state.de.us/corp/q&a.htm#expedite>.
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lawyers stand to benefit from additional incorporations in
Delaware. Non-Delaware lawyers can and do have occasion to
retain Delaware attorneys for counsel on the interpretation of
Delaware law, and many corporate lawsuits are filed in Dela-
ware to take advantage of the expertise and efficiency of the
Delaware judiciary.
If non-Delaware attorneys wanted to compete with Dela-
ware's dominance in the corporate chartering business, we
might expect two things to occur. First, these attorneys should
be lobbying their state legislatures to develop specialized busi-
ness courts to compete with Delaware's. Regardless of the pro-
visions of the corporate code, Delaware's superior judiciary
would persist and provide a good reason to incorporate in
Delaware. The Delaware Chancery Court, the state's forum for
corporate litigation, hears approximately 500 business-related
cases a year.3" The Chancery Court resolves those cases
promptly, and its decisions are rarely appealed. Only five per-
cent of its decisions are appealed to the state Supreme
Court-Delaware has no intermediate appellate court-and in
those appeals the Supreme Court upholds the Chancery Court
in seventy-five percent of the cases.36 If a case is appealed to
the Supreme Court, that court generally renders a decision in
about thirty days from submission." Thus, litigants know that
Delaware will provide a prompt resolution of their dispute, and
corporate managers might well value this in deciding where to
incorporate. Providing a local business court, with specialized
expertise and expedited procedures, might encourage business
litigants to stay at home with their cases or, better yet, incor-
porate in the jurisdiction with an efficient judicial system. In
reality, however, this has not happened. New York is experi-
menting with a specialized business court, and the idea is un-
der consideration or in the experimental stages in a few other
states, but Delaware remains essentially unchallenged.38
35. This statistic and the ones that follow in this paragraph were the prod-
uct of a formal study by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E.
Norman Veasey, and were reported by Justice Veasey in a speech to the Tulane
Corporate Law Institute on March 4, 1999. See Celia Cohen, The Appeal of the
Chancery Court, DEL. L. WKLY. (Mar. 16, 1999).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, Business
Courts: Towards a More Efficient Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947 (1997).
2000]
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Second, non-Delaware attorneys might lobby for federal in-
corporation to supplant Delaware. Something akin to this is
occurring in the bankruptcy field. Lawyers outside of Dela-
ware are seeking to diminish the dominance of the Delaware
bankruptcy court, which has become the preeminent bank-
ruptcy court in the nation for reorganizations of large publicly-
held corporations. 9 Venue provisions in bankruptcy laws allow
the debtor to choose the state of its incorporation, among other
possible venues, as the place to file for bankruptcy.4 ° Bank-
ruptcy lawyers outside of Delaware, seeking to eliminate Dela-
ware's dominance and capture some legal business, are pro-
posing a change in the bankruptcy law to require that a
jurisdiction have a greater connection to the debtor than just
being its state of incorporation.41 Drawing on the efforts of
their counterparts in the bankruptcy bar, if non-Delaware cor-
porate lawyers wanted to eliminate the preference that liti-
gants have for the Delaware courts in corporate matters, the
easiest strategy would be to federalize corporate law by adopt-
ing a national corporate code and providing for federal incorpo-
rations. Then Delaware courts would not have jurisdiction
over disputes unless there was some other nexus to the dis-
pute. Again, there is no such movement afoot.
In response to this analysis, advocates of the competition
theory, whether believers of the race to the bottom or top,
might argue that the New Jersey committee quoted by Cary
and Winter, like any group seeking a change in corporate law,
was appealing to the legislators' fiscal concerns, the fear of
losing incorporation and franchise fees. In most states, how-
ever, these fees are an insignificant portion of revenue. In her
1993 book, The Genius of American Corporate Law, Professor
Roberta Romano analyzed this data. As of 1990, the most re-
cent year for which she presented data, the vast majority of
states charged $100 or less, with some charging as little as
$10.42 The same was true for annual franchise taxes, which,
again, were nominal, accounting for one-tenth of one percent,
39. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Forum Shop-
ping by Insolvent Corporations: Precommitment, Investment Incentives and the
Race to the Top (forthcoming, manuscript on file with author).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994).
41. See NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS 770-87 (1997).
42. See ROMANO, supra note 29, at 10-11.
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or less, of taxes collected in nineteen states and five-tenths of
one percent, or less, in thirty-three states.43 By contrast, fran-
chise fees in Delaware can range up to $150,000 per year for a
large corporation and are a significant portion of the state's tax
revenues, typically accounting for fifteen to twenty percent of
state revenues. In 1998, for instance, corporate franchise tax
revenue collected in Delaware amounted to almost $400 mil-
lion, or more than nineteen percent of all taxes collected in the
state." Its corporate income tax revenue that year was less
than one-quarter of its franchise tax revenue.45 By comparison,
in states with a corporate income tax, that tax is a large multi-
ple of corporate franchise tax revenue.46 Delaware clearly has
an economic interest in maintaining its position as a jurisdic-
tion of choice for incorporations, but if it is competing for the
revenue, it appears that only a handful of other jurisdictions
are its competitors. In only five states--Alabama, Louisiana,
Rhode Island, Tennessee and Texas-were 1990 franchise fees
more than two percent of state tax revenues. None of these
states is a significant jurisdiction of incorporation for publicly-
held corporations, the bread and butter of Delaware's incorpo-
ration business.
Professor Romano devotes a full chapter of her book to the
Cary/Winter debate, but only a single paragraph to whether, in
fact, states compete for corporate charters. Her conclusion is
that they do, because she observes that states adopt statutory
innovations and the states most responsive to change are the
best in attracting and retaining incorporations.47 This may
confuse cause with effect. Surely states adopt statutory inno-
vations, but their motivations for doing so may be more com-
plex than a desire to attract revenues. Romano also notes that
the states most dependent on franchise fees are also the most
responsive to change.4" While this does suggest an economic
motivation, it also suggests a far more limited competition than
43. See id.
44. See State of Delaware Department of Finance, 1998 Delaware Fiscal
Notebook (last modified Jan. 9, 1999) <http://www.state.de.us/finance/
publications/fiscalnotebook/FiscalNotebookPage.htm>.
45. See id.
46. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1998 323 (1998). For instance, in 1997, Colo-
rado corporate income tax was 64 times corporate license fees.
47. See ROMANO, supra note 29, at 16.
48. See id.
2000]
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Cary and Winter assumed. As noted above, for only a few
states is corporate franchise tax revenue important and, ironi-
cally, those states do not compete with Delaware for new incor-
porations or reincorportions. Romano, like Cary and Winter,
simply assumes away other reasons that states amend their
corporate laws. This promotes a somewhat cynical view of
state legislators, who may act for other reasons, such as the
sincere belief that, regardless of the revenue effect, a change in
the statute is sensible and furthers good public policy. In other
areas of the law, we like to think that such motives predomi-
nate, but in the corporate area we assume just the opposite.
While the assumption that a concern for corporate fran-
chise fees influences the shape of Delaware statutory law
seems warranted, given the importance of those fees to the
state treasury, it is less obvious that the Delaware courts
would abrogate their judicial independence by deciding cases
with a view toward revenue maximization. Nevertheless, Cary
believed that he had discovered such a bias, and thus added a
powerful argument to his thesis.49 A review of Delaware juris-
prudence in the past twenty-five years casts doubt on Cary's
conclusions regarding the movement of corporate law in the
Delaware courts and, therefore, on his broader conclusion re-
garding Delaware's single-minded commitment to attracting
incorporations. A review of legislative developments, both in-
side and outside of Delaware, similarly has not supported the
broad arguments made by Cary and Winter. The next section
considers this evidence.
II. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE CARY AND WINTER THESES
A. Case Law Developments
Cary's considerable emphasis on Delaware case law likely
reflects a view that the judiciary bears the primary responsi-
bility for defining the fiduciary duties of directors. Most corpo-
rate statutes, including Delaware's, provide little guidance on
the content of the fiduciary duties owed by directors and others
to corporate shareholders. Indeed, some commentators have
suggested Delaware legislators intentionally left these duties
49. See Cary, supra note 1, at 670.
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indeterminate to enhance the role of its judiciary.5" Thus, Cary
probably believed he could not make the case that Delaware
had the pro-management policy he hypothesized unless he
could demonstrate that Delaware courts cooperated with the
legislature in shaping Delaware law.
Cary's criticism of the judiciary focused on seven Delaware
cases." On the whole, the cases he selected might be charac-
terized as "pro-management," but they hardly tell the whole
story of Delaware case law, either then or now. A brief exami-
nation of Delaware case law, from the time of Cary's writing
through the present day, tells a different story.
1. Unfair Dealings with Shareholders and Disclosure
Obligations.
Cary devoted several paragraphs of his article to a 1957
case called American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp.,52
which arose out of an attempt by American Hardware to take
over Savage Arms. Fearing a planned tender offer by Ameri-
can Hardware, Savage Arms proposed to acquire a company
called Aircraft Armaments in exchange for Savage Arms stock.
This transaction, if approved by the Savage Arms shareholders,
would have placed a large block of Savage Arms stock in
friendly hands, thwarting the proposed takeover by American
Hardware. Naturally, American Hardware opposed this trans-
action, and it sought to enjoin the Savage Arms' shareholder
meeting at which the transaction would be considered and
voted upon.
Among other things, American Hardware complained that
the meeting was called on only sixteen days notice, leaving in-
sufficient time for it to solicit the Savage Arms shareholders to
vote against the proposal.53 In particular, American Hardware
argued, the short notice made it impossible to contact share-
50. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998).
51. Winter did not analyze Delaware case law. Consistent with his overall
thesis, Winter might have said that if the Delaware judiciary acted with the same
motivations as its legislature-to attract incorporations-the courts would, in the
long run, decide cases in a way that was in the best interests of shareholders. Al-
ternatively, if attracting incorporations was not the basis of the Delaware courts'
decisions, analysis of the cases is of little use.
52. 136 A.2d 690 (Del. 1957)
53. See id. at 692.
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holders who held their stock in the name of a registered broker-
dealer, as apparently one-third of the shareholders did. The
court rejected this argument as a basis for an injunction be-
cause the Delaware statute and the Savage Arms bylaws each
required only ten days notice.54 The court acknowledged that
shareholders who held their stock in street name might not re-
ceive a solicitation from American Hardware, but it held those
shareholders knowingly assumed that risk.55 The corporation
was only required to follow the statute and its bylaws, and it
had done so in this case.56
American Hardware also objected to what it characterized
as misleading disclosures in the Savage Arms proxy state-
ment.57 The proxy statement identified one director who voted
against the acquisition, but it did not disclose that an addi-
tional three of the company's eleven directors also voted
against the transaction. The Delaware Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that "it would have been preferable to state all of
the facts,"58 but it nevertheless held that this omission did not
warrant an injunction of the meeting. The court noted that the
SEC rules governing the solicitation of proxies technically did
not require Savage Arms to disclose the three additional dis-
sents because, at that time, Savage Arms was only required to
disclose the names of any director who informed it in writing of
his intent to oppose the action.59 Only one director-the one
that Savage Arms named-had given written notice. Moreo-
ver, the court noted that American Hardware itself had in-
formed the shareholders of the other dissenting votes. °
Cary states the facts and holding of this case, and con-
trasts it with a federal proxy case decided by the Supreme
Court in which a more exacting standard of disclosure guided
the Court.61 Cary implies the American Hardware story was an
example of the Delaware court accommodating Savage Arms'
evil incumbent directors, who were indifferent to the interests
of the company's shareholders. As far as Cary was concerned,
54. See id. at 692-93.
55. See id. at 692.
56. See id. at 693.
57. See id. at 693-94.
58. Id. at 694.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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the Delaware court simply ignored the directors' dishonesty
and sharp dealing.62
The American Hardware case stands in remarkable con-
trast to two post-1975 Delaware cases, one addressing sharp
practices and the other misleading proxy statements. In Bla-
sius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,63 a 1988 case, the Atlas
board was under attack from Blasius, which was soliciting the
Atlas shareholders to vote to amend Atlas's bylaws to increase
the board from seven to fifteen members, and to fill the result-
ing eight vacancies with Blasius nominees. If successful, this
would have given Blasius control of the Atlas board and per-
mitted it to proceed with a proposed restructuring of the target
company. In response to the Blasius plan, the Atlas board
voted to increase its size to nine and fill the resulting two va-
cancies with more friendly directors. These defensive actions
were consistent with the Delaware statute and Atlas's bylaws.
Nonetheless, the Delaware court enjoined the action, opining
that, although legal, the actions of the Atlas board unduly in-
terfered with the shareholder voting process, and the board's
action was therefore set aside.64 Simply put, Blasius Industries
illustrates that the Delaware courts will not countenance all
sharp practices of incumbent management. Thus, American
Hardware is clearly not the last word on the role of the Dela-
ware courts in matters of shareholder voting.
One can level similar criticism toward Cary's analysis of
the proxy phase of the American Hardware case; Delaware
courts do police against dishonesty. In Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp.,65 a 1977 case with a follow-up decision in 1981,66 the
Delaware Supreme Court held directors to a remarkably high
standard of candor when communicating with their sharehold-
ers. These cases arose out of an attempt by Vickers Energy
Corp., which owned a majority of the stock of TransOcean Oil,
Inc., to acquire the remaining minority interest in TransOcean.
Vickers sent a tender offer to TransOcean's minority share-
holders offering to buy their stock at $12 per share. Allegedly,
Vickers failed to disclose two facts: first, that a member of
TransOcean's management had calculated a potentially higher
62. See Cary, supra note 1, at 675-77.
63. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
64. See id. at 663.
65. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
66. See 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
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value for the company; and second, that Vickers' management
had authorized open market purchases of TransOcean stock for
up to $15 per share prior to the tender offer. The Delaware
courts agreed that this lack of candor on the part of Vickers,
which owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of TransO-
cean, was a violation of Delaware law, entitling the plaintiff-
shareholders to money damages.67
The Vickers case announced and implemented a disclosure
duty that appears more exacting than the federal case that
Cary cited as an exemplary decision.68 In Delaware, the court
announced, fiduciary duties to shareholders include a duty of
"complete candor," which, on its face at least, seems to go be-
yond the standard announced by the federal courts.69 The
Delaware court's opinion also reaffirmed the existence of a fi-
duciary duty from directors and officers to their corporation, to
the stockholders as a whole, and to individual stockholders."
Cary had suggested that Delaware law was otherwise.71 Fi-
nally, time has proven that the Delaware court's decision in
Vickers was not merely a reaction to Cary's criticism, as some
scholars have suggested.7 2  In a recent decision, Malone v.
Brincat,"3 for instance, the Delaware Supreme Court expanded
liability for directors who allegedly misstate the truth, even if
those misstatements are not made in connection with a call for
shareholder action.
2. Duty of Care.
Cary was also critical of Delaware's decisions on a direc-
tor's duty of care.7 4 All state corporate codes recognize that di-
67. See Vickers, 383 A.2d at 281 ("Technically speaking, the language may
be accurate; but that kind of generality is hardly a substitute for hard facts when
the law requires complete candor.").
68. For a criticism that the Delaware Supreme Court went too far in the
case, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Di-
rector's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996).
69. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
70. See Vickers, 429 A.2d at 503 & n.4.
71. See Cary, supra note 1, at 672.
72. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflec-
tions on Recent Developments in Delaware's Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 914
(1982) (suggesting that one of the "effects" of Cary's criticism of the Delaware
court was to cause the court to adopt a more pro-shareholder view in its cases).
73. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
74. See Cary, supra note 1, at 683-84.
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rectors have a duty to the shareholders to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation with a requisite degree of care.75
Many courts, including the Delaware courts, have struggled
with defining just what that duty entails. Cary focused on a
single 1963 Delaware case, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing Co.76 The case arose after Allis-Chalmers, a manu-
facturer of electrical equipment, and four of its officers pled
guilty to violations of the antitrust laws. Shareholders com-
plained that, had the directors not been asleep at the switch,
the antitrust laws would not have been violated and the corpo-
ration would not have suffered the losses that arose from its
guilty plea. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the claim,
reasoning that the board had no obligation to "operate a corpo-
rate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they
have no reason to suspect exists."77 Cary suggested that the
Delaware court set too low a standard for directors.78
Relatively few decisions nationwide had considered the
duty of oversight when the Delaware court decided Graham, or
since. Nevertheless, in a widely-reported decision of the Dela-
ware Chancery Court in 1996, In re Caremark International
Inc. Derivative Litigation,79 the Delaware Chancellor an-
nounced that Graham no longer reflected Delaware law on the
duty of oversight. Chancellor Allen, then a highly respected ju-
rist in Delaware, articulated a proactive role for directors, in
sharp contrast to the more passive role reflected in the Graham
decision." Allen ruled in In re Caremark that directors have a
duty to install adequate information and reporting systems to
enable the board to reach informed judgments concerning the
corporation's compliance with law.8' If this is an accurate
statement of Delaware law, then one can describe Delaware as
articulating a high standard of fiduciary duty for Delaware di-
rectors.
More striking than the In re Caremark decision was the
Delaware Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Smith v. Van
75. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1998).
76. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
77. Id. at 130.
78. See Cary, supra note 1, at 684.
79. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
80. See id. at 969-70.
81. See id. at 970.
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Gorkom.82 While In re Caremark dealt with the directors' duty
of oversight, Van Gorkom dealt directly with the duty of direc-
tors to exercise care in making business judgments and, more
specifically, with judicial review of such business decisions. In
Van Gorkom, a case that shocked the corporate bar, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held the directors of the Trans Union
Corporation personally liable for damages because the court
found, in essence, that they simply did not do enough home-
work before agreeing to a sale of the company. 3 This was de-
spite the facts that the directors had no conflicts of interest in
approving the transaction, were highly qualified and respected
individuals, and the sale was for a considerable premium over
market price.8" The Delaware courts in these cases can hardly
be said to be pandering to directors in order to attract man-
agement to incorporate in the state.
3. Takeover Cases
Another Delaware decision that Cary criticized was in the
takeover area, then in its jurisprudential infancy. Arguably,
the takeover cases might be characterized as the most impor-
tant cases to a manager of a publicly-held corporation contem-
plating whether to incorporate elsewhere or to remain within a
particular jurisdiction. Corporate management would gener-
ally favor a jurisdiction that gives it wide discretion in defeat-
ing a hostile takeover. Cary so characterized Delaware, citing
Cheff v. Mathes,5 a 1964 case that upheld a board's decision to
buy out a potential purchaser of the company at a premium, an
early greenmail case. The case has become the paradigm for
an unwise business decision-the corporation failed soon after
the takeover was killed-that may have been motivated by the
incumbent board's desire to remain in office. To Cary, this case
illustrated, once again, a judiciary with a "clear penchant in fa-
vor of management." 6
However, Cheff v. Mathes has hardly been the last word on
the duties of incumbent management when faced with a hostile
takeover. While Delaware courts have accorded a measure of
82. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
83. See id. at 874.
84. See id. at 893-94 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
85. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
86. Cary, supra note 1, at 673.
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deference to directors who resist a hostile takeover,87 it is far
too simplistic to dismiss this now rich jurisprudence as merely
deferential to management.'8 Several decisions within the past
year alone, for instance, demonstrate the balanced approach of
the Delaware courts in this area.89 In these cases, the Dela-
ware courts invalidated an increasingly popular takeover de-
fense known as a "dead hand provision." In short, a dead hand
provision limits or eliminates the ability of newly-elected direc-
tors to dismantle antitakeover defenses, such as poison pills,9 °
of the previous board. Many companies have adopted so-called
poison pill defenses, or shareholder rights plans, that make a
hostile takeover economically impracticable. A dead hand pro-
vision makes it impossible for a hostile suitor to elect a slate of
directors and remove the poison pill. The combination of a poi-
son pill and a dead hand provision assures that a hostile bidder
can achieve neither a successful tender offer nor a successful
proxy fight to obtain control of a corporation.9
The Delaware courts invalidated the dead hand tactic be-
cause it unduly interferes with the right of elected directors to
manage the corporation.92 At least one other state had ruled
otherwise on dead hand provisions,93 suggesting there was
precedent for a similar result by the Delaware courts, and that
the result reached in Delaware was not inevitable. In this, and
in many other instances, Delaware courts have demonstrated
87. See, e.g., Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989).
88. For a more nuanced analysis of Delaware case law, see Edward B. Rock,
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009 (1997).
89. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 92.
90. For a description of the poison pill defense, see JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 903-05 (4th ed. 1995).
91. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Dead-
hand Pills, and Shareholder Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19
CARDozO L. REV. 511 (1997).
92. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)
(invalidating a "delayed redemption provision"); Camody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723
A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (invalidating a dead hand provision under Delaware
law).
93. See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Tech., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (upholding a dead hand poison pill under Georgia law). An earlier New
York case had reached a contrary conclusion under New York law. See Bank of
New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
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an admirable measure of independence from any supposed
state policy of attracting incorporations.94
4. The Federal Comparison
Ironically, not only have the Delaware courts failed to fol-
low the pro-management path that Cary predicted, but the fed-
eral courts have ceased to be the faithful guardian of share-
holder rights that Cary extolled. A few years after Cary
published his article, the Supreme Court announced that fed-
eral courts should not equate conduct amounting to a breach of
fiduciary duty with securities fraud.9" Thus, the trend that de-
veloped in the 1960s and 1970s, in which federal courts were
becoming the venue of choice for claims relating to corporate
misconduct,96 came to an abrupt halt by the early 1980s.
Moreover, in a series of decisions that followed soon after Cary
published his article, the Court tightened the standards for
what constitutes securities fraud, thus further limiting the in-
volvement of the federal courts in corporate litigation.97 Thus,
false statements that might have given rise to a federal securi-
94. E.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999) (liberally
construing pleading requirements in derivative action raising entire fairness
claim).
95. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
96. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976)
(freeze-out merger without business purpose is fraudulent under Rule 10b-5);
Dranchman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1971) (self-dealing may be fraudu-
lent under Rule 10b-5); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(unfair purchase by insider of stock from the corporation actionable under Rule
10b-5 even in the absence of deception); see also Ralph Ferrara & Marc Steinberg,
A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 263 (1980) (discussing the relationship between federal and state law after
Santa Fe). See generally 3D HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF,
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 22-1 to 22-195 (2d ed. 1998).
97. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164 (1994) (denying aider and abetter liability under Rule 10b-5); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (maintaining a private damage action
under Rule 10b-5 requires that the plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with
scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding
that plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to have standing to main-
tain a private cause of action for damages under Rule 10b-5). But see Herman &
Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 357 (1983) (allowing an action to be maintained
under Rule 10b-5 even if a remedy under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 is
available and holding that plaintiff need only prove the well-pleaded allegations of
his complaint by a preponderance of the evidence, not a higher clear and con-
vincing standard).
DELAWARE AS DEMON
ties claim in 1975 would not today,9" while false statements
that Cary thought would not violate Delaware law do today.99
The cases that Cary chose to cite and discuss give an im-
pression that, at least up to that time, managers always won
and shareholders always lost in the Delaware courts. That im-
pression is surely misleading; Delaware courts had a more bal-
anced view of the law even at the time Cary was writing his ar-
ticle.'00 Thus, it is not the case that a sea change has occurred
in Delaware in the intervening twenty-five years. Rather, Cary
simply overstated the case in 1974. Moreover, Cary was wrong
to suggest that shareholders were disadvantaged in the Dela-
ware courts, as this cursory review of post-1974 Delaware j udi-
cial decisions makes abundantly clear. It neither was, nor is,
the case that Delaware judges decide cases solely to further the
interests of corporate managers. What underlying philosophy,
if any, they do employ, however, is beyond the scope of this pa-
per.' In any event, an important support for Cary's thesis is
weak, at best. A review of legislative changes in Delaware and
elsewhere provides somewhat more support for the notion that
Delaware acts to protect corporate managers, and that other
states follow. However, as the next section demonstrates, the
evidence is less than overwhelming.
98. In 1976, the Supreme Court decided that negligence would not support a
cause of action under Rule 10b-5, overruling some lower federal courts that had
ruled otherwise. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 187. In Central Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. at 167, the Court upset settled precedent in the lower federal courts
when it held that a claim for aiding and abetting liability could not be maintained
under Rule 10b-5.
99. Cary surely would have been surprised at the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998), holding that direc-
tors may be liable for false statements even if not made in connection with a so-
licitation for shareholder action. By comparison, under federal law, a plaintiff al-
leging a false statement in a proxy solicitation must demonstrate that the proxy
solicitation was an "essential link" in the transaction. See Virginia Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
100. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971)
(holding that Delaware directors breached their duty to shareholders by taking
action that, although permitted under the Delaware corporate code and the com-
pany's bylaws, was inequitable and interfered with corporate democracy); Bennett
v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962) (requiring directors to demonstrate that the
repurchase of shares from a potential acquirer was "primarily in the corporate in-
terest").
101. See generally Rock, supra note 88.
20001
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
B. Statutory Developments
A review of changes in the Delaware General Corporation
Law is more complex. Delaware frequently amends its corpo-
rate statute, nearly annually, in fact. Interestingly, few other
states amend their corporate laws with such frequency. This
suggests, again, that states do not compete with one another
for incorporations. It is as though Sony alone improved the
features of its CD players each year, while JVC, Magnovox, and
other manufacturers updated theirs only every five to ten
years. Under such circumstances, it would not appear that
JVC and Magnovox were competing with Sony. In any event,
Delaware's statutory changes often respond to judicial deci-
sions that either illuminate an ambiguity in the statute, °2 or
create some controversy.' In either case, the resulting statu-
tory changes seem to be those that corporate management
would favor. 04 This observation would tend to support Cary's
thesis; Cary would say that he expected nothing less. Judge
Winter might respond, however, that one cannot characterize a
change as favoring management or shareholders because, in
the end, a statute that does not serve the interests of share-
holders cannot survive. There is reason to doubt both proposi-
tions.
102. In 1998, the legislature amended section 251(c) of the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law to make clear that a board of directors can submit to a
shareholder vote a merger agreement that the board no longer supports. This
amendment addressed a problem in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985), and subsequent merger cases. See Edward P. Welch & James L. Love, Re-
cent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law, 1 DEL. L. REv. 267, 269 (1998). In
1997, the legislature amended section 211 to allow shareholders to elect directors
by written consent in lieu of holding an annual meeting. The Chancery Court de-
cision in Hochett v. TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996), had held
that the election of directors by written consent of stockholders in lieu of a meet-
ing does not satisfy the statutory requirement in section 228 that the corporation
hold an annual meeting.
103. The most prominent example of this is the amendment to section 102(b)
of the statute to allow a corporation to limit the liability of its directors for
breaches of the duty of care following the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
104. See id. See also the 1995 amendment to section 145, which provides for
indemnification of directors. This amendment simplified the process for obtaining
indemnification. 69 Del. Laws 522 (1994); see also Brenda G. Houck, Statutory





Doubt is cast on Cary's thesis if the Delaware legislature
amends its statute in a way that clearly advantages sharehold-
ers vis-a-vis management, or if the legislature fails to adopt a
pro-management provision that appears in other state codes.
Doubt is also cast if other states fail to adopt promptly an im-
portant Delaware statutory innovation. A review of corporate
codes discloses examples of all three of these doubt-casting
phenomena. While Delaware has not frequently amended its
law to favor shareholders or passed on the opportunity to adopt
innovations in other state laws, these things occur. More tell-
ing, many states are slow to amend their codes to adopt the
latest Delaware corporate innovation.
An example of what Cary might have characterized as a
"pro-shareholder" Delaware provision can be found in the 1998
amendments to the Delaware code. Last year, the Delaware
legislature adopted a provision that requires directors to de-
clare the advisability of a merger agreement before submitting
it to the shareholders. °5 Before this statutory change, direc-
tors merely had to approve a merger agreement before submit-
ting it to a vote of the shareholders.'0 6 After the amendment,
the directors have the additional obligation and the sharehold-
ers have an additional, albeit small, statutory protection, which
insures that the directors are acting in their interests.' Al-
though the change is uncontroversial, and conforms this sec-
tion of Delaware law to other sections,'0 8 it is also clearly not a
dilution of the rights of shareholders vis-a-vis management. To
the contrary, it enhances shareholder rights.
Examples of Delaware's failure to adopt a pro-management
provision from other state codes or the failure of other states to
adopt Delaware innovations are abundant. For instance, many
states allow corporations to limit the liability of officers for
105. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (Supp. 1998). See also Welch &
Love, supra note 102, at 267.
106. See title 8, § 251(b).
107. See id. The section now provides, in part, that if the corporation has
capital stock, its board of directors "shall adopt a resolution setting forth the
amendment proposed, declaring its advisability." Id. (emphasis added). The itali-
cized words were added by the amendment.
108. Title 8, section 242(b)(1) of the Delaware Code requires that the board
of directors declare that a charter amendment is "advisable" before submitting it
to a vote of the shareholders. See id.
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negligent conduct. °9 The Delaware code does not, providing
only that the liability of directors, and not that of officers, may
be limited.11 ° More importantly, in Delaware it is harder for
the directors to get a court to dismiss a derivative action filed
against them than it is in other states. In Delaware, as com-
pared to, say, New York, the courts will scrutinize the decision
of a director-created special litigation committee to dismiss a
derivative action against corporate management."' Some
commentators have suggested that the Delaware legislature
has rejected the New York approach because of resistance of
the Delaware bar. Presumably, both defendants' and plaintiffs'
bars desire to preserve this lucrative area of practice, and they
oppose statutory reform that makes it too easy for defendants
to dispose of the litigation. 2 This explanation of Delaware's
reluctance to protect officers and directors is questionable.
Evidence of such a conspiracy is lacking, and the explanation is
hard to square with other actions of the Delaware legislature
that have the effect of limiting shareholder litigation. The
prime example of this is the Delaware legislature's reaction to
Smith v. Van Gorkom, discussed above." 3  The legislature
109. Compare id. § 102(b)(7) ("the certificate of incorporation may ... con-
tain ... [a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director")
with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1998) ("[t]he charter of
the corporation may include any provision expanding or limiting the liability of its
directors and officers to the corporation or its stockholders"), VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-692.1(A)(2) (Michie 1999) (limiting the liability of officers and directors),
and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1999) ("[tlhe certificate of incorpo-
ration may provide that a director or officer shall not be personally liable, or shall
be liable only to the extent therein provided").
110. See title 8, § 102(b)(6).
111. Compare, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (hold-
ing that if the corporation's special litigation committee was independent and
disinterested, and employed adequate and appropriate investigative procedures
and methodologies, its decision to dismiss derivative litigation is entitled to the
protections of the business judgment rule), with Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (finding that if the special litigation committee was inde-
pendent and demonstrated reasonable bases for good faith findings and recom-
mendations, the Chancery Court should determine, applying its own business
judgment, whether the committee's recommendation to dismiss the litigation
should be granted).
112. This arguably explains why Delaware does not have a statute requiring
plaintiffs with small shareholdings who file derivative actions to post security for
expenses. See Law for Sale, supra note 7, at 888. Statutes requiring derivative
plaintiffs to post security for expenses, although popular several years ago, are
only retained in eight states today. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.40, at 7-
260 (Supp. 1997).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
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amended its corporate code to allow corporations to limit the
liability of directors for breach of the duty of care, potentially
cutting off a substantial amount of litigation. Why did the de-
fendants' and plaintiffs' bars not join to resist this statutory
change? In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that the defen-
dants' bar initiated this change.
Finally, there are many instances in which states have
failed to follow Delaware's lead in statutory innovation. For
instance, in 1995, Delaware adopted a new provision permit-
ting a Delaware corporation to reorganize as a holding com-
pany, subject to certain limitations, without shareholder ap-
proval." 4 Transactions contemplated by this new section would
have required shareholder approval under prior law." 5 Only a
few states have adopted this innovation.116
2. Refuting Winter
Winter, though, is less easy to refute, at least if one accepts
his assumptions. Winter starts from the premise that the
states compete to provide an economically efficient corporate
code." 7 If a corporate code is inefficient, the state will not be
able to "sell" it to promoters and corporate managers choosing a
jurisdiction in which to incorporate. According to this logic, in
the long term, the Delaware corporate law simply cannot be
economically inefficient, and it is folly to seek to characterize a
provision or amendment as favoring management or share-
holders. The Delaware antitakeover statute, however, presents
a problem in this analysis."' As a matter of theory, supported
by some empirical research," 9 antitakeover statutes are ineffi-
cient because they impede the market for corporate control,
leaving corporations in the hands of ineffective managers.
114. See title 8, §251(g). For a description of this provision, see C. Stephen
Bigler, 1995 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, INSIGHTS,
Aug. 1995, at 21.
115. See title 8, § 251(c).
116. A computer search in March 1999 found that only three states had
adopted provisions similar to Delaware's section 251(g). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§607.11045(3) (West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §351.448(1) (West Supp. 1999);
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. §5.03(H) (West Supp. 1999).
117. See Winter, supra note 18, at 254.
118. See title 8, § 203.
119. See Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Fed-
eral and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980).
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An unfettered market for corporate control assures that
corporate assets will move to those investors placing the high-
est value on those assets, furthering economic efficiency. If the
market for corporate control is distorted, inefficient corporate
laws can continue to exist, as entrepreneurs will be discour-
aged in their attempt to take over a corporation and reincorpo-
rate it in a jurisdiction with a more efficient law. Winter's the-
sis, therefore, depends on the absence of an antitakeover
statute in the same way that the rules of basketball depend on
a fixed time for the length of the game. If the game had no
endpoint, the other rules simply would not matter. In the con-
text of Winter's thesis, an antitakeover statute may be the only
corporate law one can identify ex ante as being economically in-
efficient. Indeed, Winter and other proponents of the view that
states compete to offer the most efficient corporate law are
strong advocates of the view that state antitakeover statutes
are economically inefficient. 2 ' Not surprisingly, they have had
a difficult time explaining how such statutes can persist in the
competitive environment that they postulate.' 2'
While Delaware joins many other states that have adopted
various measures to strengthen the position of corporate man-
agers in defeating hostile takeovers,'22 roughly one-third of the
states have not done so. 2 ' This state of affairs says a great
deal about the race debate. On one hand, we can explain
Delaware's law as an example of Cary's race to the bottom. Ac-
cording to this argument, Delaware enacted its law because
other states had provided protection to incumbent manage-
120. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161,
1188 (1981); Winter, supra note 18, at 288.
121. For a review of these efforts, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell,
Federalism and Takeover Law; The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999).
122. For a recent summary of the various state antitakeover statutes, see
From the Hustings: The Roll of States With Takeover Control Laws, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 55, 55-56, indicating that, as of mid-1997, 41
states had adopted some type of statutory takeover controls. This number in-
cludes states with so-called "other constituency" statutes, which permit directors
to consider constituencies other than shareholders when considering corporate
action, including defenses to hostile takeovers. Not all commentators would char-
acterize such statutes (which 30 states had adopted) as antitakeover statutes.
123. See id. at 55. States without such statutes include Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id.
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ment, and Delaware had to follow suit to avoid losing corpora-
tions.124 Delaware could not, and did not, cite the justification
that other states relied upon in enacting their antitakeover
statutes: that a change in corporate control results in a loss of
jobs in the state and in harm to communities within the
state. 125  Very few of Delaware's corporations have operations
in the state, so Delaware rarely suffers the sorts of losses that
other states incur when a change of control occurs in a Dela-
ware corporation. Delaware was simply protecting its incorpo-
ration business.
126
On the other hand, Delaware's statute does allow corpora-
tions to opt out of its protective provisions, and some corpora-
tions have done so. The statute is also less of an impediment to
a takeover than other statutes; it merely limits the ability of a
hostile acquirer to enter into a business combination with the
target for a three-year period following the takeover. This
would tend to support Winter's thesis: Delaware's restraint, he
might say, reflects its appreciation for the economic realities of
corporate statutes.
The truth, again, lies somewhere between Cary and Win-
ter. Delaware does react to the interests of corporate manage-
ment, in the same way that major airlines design their fre-
124. See generally Alan E. Garfield, State Competence to Regulate Corporate
Takeovers: Lessons From State Takeover Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535 (1989)
(reviewing the legislative history of the Delaware statute and concluding that the
Delaware legislature acted to protect its position as a jurisdiction of choice for
corporate charters and responded to promote managerial interests).
125. See id. at 583.
126. In theory, the fact that Delaware's antitakeover statute helped it main-
tain its desirability as a jurisdiction of choice for incorporation does not suggest
the legislature's motive in enacting the law. It seems clear, however, that Dela-
ware was concerned with appealing to corporate managers by providing a law that
deterred hostile takeovers. Shareholders might favor an antitakeover law that
protected them against coercive tender offers, i.e., bids structured to encourage
shareholders to tender even when they feel the price is inadequate. But the
Delaware statute goes well beyond that, limiting the ability of an acquirer to ef-
fectuate a business combination with the target unless the target board consents.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991 & Supp. 1998). This provides no share-
holder protection, but does deter some offers. Similarly, with a view to share-
holder preferences, the Delaware legislature could have made the protections of
the Delaware antitakeover statute subject to shareholder approval on an opt-in
basis, as they did some years ago with a provision allowing corporations to limit
the liability of corporate directors. See id. § 102(b)(7). In the antitakeover con-
text, however, corporate managers may elect to opt out. See id. § 203(b). This,
too, demonstrates the motivations of the Delaware legislature. For a fuller devel-
opment of this point, see Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 121.
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quent flier programs for the corporate travelers who buy airline
tickets. But neither Delaware nor the airlines can act without
restraint. Delaware probably is restrained by the economic
principles that Winter identified, but only to an extent. The
Delaware legislature, and the corporate law committee that
advises it, likely consider multiple factors, including the inter-
ests of both management and shareholders, as well as a crude
assessment of economic efficiency. 2 '
C. Convergence of State Law and the Effect of the Stock
Exchange Rules
As both Cary and Winter accepted the premise that state
legislatures consciously compete with one another to provide
attractive corporate codes, each might have reasonably antici-
pated a convergence of statutory law. The differences among
corporate statutes, particularly in reference to provisions of
critical importance to corporate management, should decline.
In reality, however, a great deal of diversity persists in corpo-
rate law.12 These differences may persist because legislators
responsible for enacting those laws may not be motivated--or
at least are not only motivated-to attract incorporations.
While legislators are concerned with providing a modem, effi-
cient corporate statute, that is not their only consideration.
Fairness to shareholders and other constituents, at least as
perceived by the state legislature and the members of the
state's corporate bar who often advise them, is also a considera-
tion.'29 A nice example of this balance of interests emerges
from the American Bar Association's Model Business Corpora-
tion Act. The Model Act is the product of the Bar's section on
corporate, banking, and business law. The mere existence of
this work, and the large number of adoptions it has garnered,
suggests the presence of diversity in corporate law. There
127. See S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 20 (1976) (arguing, possibly somewhat self-servingly, that the corpo-
rate law revision committee, of which the author was a member, adopted "pro-
shareholder" provisions it considered appropriate, and was influenced by factors
other than managerial interests).
128. See infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
129. See Renee L. Crean, Recent Developments in New York Law, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 695 (1998) (explaining how various political factors affected the




would be little point to the Bar's scholarly drafting and com-
mentary if the Model Act simply mirrored Delaware's law. At
the end of the day, states would simply be inclined to follow
Delaware's lead.
The Model Act contains provisions not found in Delaware's
code that might be characterized as pro-shareholder and eco-
nomically inefficient. For instance, the Model Act and Dela-
ware law have long differed on whether shareholders who vote
against a proposal to sell all of the corporation's assets have
dissenters' rights.13 ° The Model Act and the laws of almost all
states provide that such shareholders may require the corpora-
tion to repurchase their shares at fair value. 3' Delaware does
not.
In the extensive 1984 revision to the Model Act, the draft-
ers included a new provision that allowed shareholders to dis-
sent from certain amendments to the articles of incorporation
and receive the fair value of their shares from the corpora-
tion.'32 While Delaware does not have a comparable provision,
as of 1997 thirty-seven states had adopted the Model Act provi-
sion.133 Similarly, the Model Act protects the rights of the
holders of a class of shares to vote as a class on amendments to
the articles of incorporation that create a new class of shares
with superior rights on dissolution. 3 4 In such circumstances,
the Delaware corporate code does not require class voting.135
Expansive dissenters' rights and class voting appeal to a
sense of fairness, even if they are inefficient. How do we ex-
plain these and other important differences between Delaware
and other states?'36 Are these simply anomalies, or do such
130. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(3) (Supp. 1997) with DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (Supp. 1998).
131. See 1 JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAws § 14.02[B]
(1999).
132. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(4) (1984).
133. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02(a)(4) annot. at 13-22 (Supp.
1997).
134. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.04(a)(6) (Supp. 1997), as set forth in
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Fundamental Changes, 54 BUS.
LAW. 685, 720 (1999).
135. See title 8, § 242.
136. For instance, the Model Act provides that, unless the articles of incor-
poration reserve the power to amend bylaws exclusively to the shareholders, di-
rectors may amend the bylaws. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a) (Supp.
1998). Delaware reverses this: unless the articles expressly authorize the direc-
tors to amend the bylaws, that power rests exclusively with the shareholders. See
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provisions reflect some deeper truth about corporate law? Mul-
tiple factors likely account for corporate law. Economic effi-
ciency is but one factor.
Earlier this year, the drafters of the Model Act promul-
gated a number of provisions that, in effect, require share-
holder approval of corporate transactions in instances in which
prior law did not. 3 7 Such provisions obviously limit the discre-
tion of management by empowering shareholders to act. The
drafters recommended these provisions to conform the Model
Act to the requirements that are now imposed on companies
listed or traded on the New York Stock Exchange,' the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange,'39 and the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ). 4 ° The
drafters, however, did not limit the applicability of the provi-
sions to publicly-traded corporations. To have done so would
have been to amend the Model Act to conform with the effective
limitation on similar Delaware corporations, which are subject
to the stock exchange listing requirements, even if those re-
quirements are in conflict with Delaware law. The drafters
thus went beyond Delaware law.
While it might be argued that, as a practical matter, these
changes only affect publicly-traded companies and, therefore,
the Model Act is not more shareholder-friendly than the Dela-
ware statute, a more conservative approach would have been to
leave the law unchanged, as the stock exchanges may, at some
point, amend their rules. The failure to adopt this more con-
title 8, § 109(a). Twenty-three jurisdictions have adopted the Model Act approach,
two jurisdictions have followed the Delaware provision and 26 jurisdictions have
drafted their own provisions. See 2 MACEY, supra note 131, at 7-66. The power of
shareholders to call a special meeting of shareholders is another instance of a
sharp demarcation between the Delaware Code and the Model Act. The Model
Act requires the board to call a special meeting of shareholders if shareholders
holding ten percent of the stock so demand (the articles of incorporation can raise
this number to no more than twenty-five percent). See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 37.02(a)(2) (Supp. 1998). Delaware is the opposite: unless the articles empower
shareholders to call a special meeting, they have no power to do so. See title 8,
§ 211(b). Most states follow the Model Act approach, which puts those states in a
competitive disadvantage in relation to Delaware. Typically, management of a
publicly held corporation would prefer that shareholders have no ability to call a
special meeting and possibly replace the board.
137. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act-Fundamental Changes, 54 Bus. LAw. 685 (1999).
138. See N.Y.S.E. Listed Co. Man. § 7 (N.Y.S.E., Inc.) (1983).
139. See 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide, Rules 701-26 9556-9564B (CCH) (1991).
140. See NASD Man. (CCH) (1999).
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servative approach may reflect the drafters' belief that the
stock exchange rules are good ones, and ought to be reflected in
state law, even if the stock exchanges subsequently amend
their rules.
More importantly, the action of the drafters reflects an ad-
ditional phenomenon-that stock exchanges play an important
role in the evolution of corporate law'--a development that
neither Cary nor Winter anticipated. In addition to specifying
a number of transactions that require shareholder approval,
the stock exchange rules delve into other aspects of corporate
governance. For instance, the rules limit the ability of listed
companies to "disparately reduce[] or restrict[]" the voting
rights of existing shareholders,' and require that a listed
company have at least two independent directors on its board"
and maintain an audit committee, a majority of the members of
which must be independent directors.'"
These corporate governance requirements are particularly
noteworthy because stock exchanges do compete for the privi-
lege of listing corporations, deriving fees from them both when
a corporation is listed on the exchange and when its shares are
traded. Like the drafters of corporate codes, stock exchanges
must provide rules that are attractive to corporate managers,
who decide where to list, and to investors, who could choose not
to invest in an exchange-listed security on the basis of its rules.
The exchanges have adopted rules of corporate governance that
Delaware has not adopted, suggesting that, in deciding be-
tween shareholder protection and management flexibility in a
competitive environment, reasonable minds can differ.
141. For a thoughtful development of this ideal, see John E. Coffee, Jr., The
Future as History: The Prospect for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999).
142. E.g., NASD Man., Rule 4310(21) (CCH) (1999).
Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded common stock
registered under Section 12 of the Act cannot be disparately reduced or
restricted through any corporate action or issuance. Examples of such
corporate action or issuance include, but are not limited to, the adoption
of time-phased voting plans, the adoption of capped voting rights plans,
the issuance of super-voting stock, or the issuance of stock with voting
rights less than the per share voting rights of the existing common stock
through an exchange offer.
Id.
143. See, e.g., id., Rule 4310(25)(B).
144. See, e.g., id., Rule 4310(25)(C). See generally 4 LouiS Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1826-54 (3d ed. 1990).
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Even among states that have adopted the Model Act, one
finds an interesting diversity in the law. In a recent article,
Professor William Carney concluded that state adoptions of the
Model Act demonstrated that state corporate statutes are in
fact highly uniform. 4 ' He noted, for instance, that as of 1996,
142 provisions of the Model Act had been adopted by an aver-
age of about thirty-seven states, or seventy-four percent of the
states.46 A closer look at these data, however, supports the op-
posite conclusion. The fact that a quarter of the states, on av-
erage, do not adopt any given provision itself suggests a mate-
rial degree of diversity among the states. More importantly,
while many provisions are adopted by a large majority of the
states, and others are rejected by a large majority of states, the
individual states adopting or rejecting any given provision vary
considerably.
Looking at just two important Model Act provisions, one
relating to the removal of directors 147 and the other relating to
the right of shareholders to dissent from amendments to the
articles of incorporation, 48 illustrates the point. Section 8.08(d)
of the Model Act provides that a director can only be removed
at a meeting of shareholders called expressly for the purpose of
removing the director, and the notice of the meeting must state
that the purpose of the meeting is to remove the director. As of
1996, thirty-three states had adopted this provision, which rep-
resents a limitation on the ability of shareholders to remove a
director. 4 1 Surprisingly, the Delaware code does not include
this limitation.1
50
Section 13.02(a)(4) of the Model Act grants to shareholders
the right to dissent from certain amendments to the articles of
incorporation, a provision that represents an expansion of
shareholder rights. As of 1996, thirty-seven states had adopted
this provision.' 5' Not surprisingly, Delaware does not grant
145. See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 715, 755 (1998).
146. See id. at 731.
147. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.08(d) (1998).
148. See id. § 13.02(a)(4).
149. See Carney, supra note 145, at 769.
150. Incumbent management would favor any provision that makes its re-
moval more difficult. Delaware's law thus allows insurgents to remove directors
through a consent solicitation, which would not be possible in a Model Act state
that adopts section 8.08(d).
151. See Carney, supra note 145, at 770.
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this right to shareholders. Ignoring Delaware, Professor Car-
ney might have cited this data as support for the uniformity of
corporate law. However, based on Carney's tables, of the
thirty-seven states that adopted section 13.02(a)(4), only
twenty-seven also adopted section 8.08(d).152 As additional
provisions are considered, the number of states that have
adopted all provisions continues to decline. Note, too, how an
analysis of just these two provisions demonstrates the willing-
ness of states to deviate from Delaware law. States must un-
derstand that even if they were to copy Delaware's statute
wholesale, they could not attract significant incorporation
business away from Delaware. Delaware's other advantages,
noted above,1 3 give it a nearly insurmountable advantage in
attracting incorporation business.5 If a state legislature accu-
rately assesses its competitive position-assuming it was oth-
erwise inclined to compete for incorporation business-it might
well conclude that considerations other than attracting incor-
poration business should motivate its legislative action.
In addition to a continued diversity in state law, which we
would not expect were there a high degree of competition, inef-
ficient corporate laws persist and, indeed, have been added to
the statute books in recent years. The next section discusses
the "Achilles' heel" of the Winter thesis, the persistence of inef-
ficient corporate laws.
D. The Persistence of Economically Inefficient Laws and
the Market for Corporate Control
According to conventional economic theory, which is re-
flected in Winter's article, competition among the states for the
corporate chartering business will motivate states to eschew
inefficient statutory provisions. As noted above, many states,
including Delaware, have antitakeover statutes.1  However,
152. See id. at 769-70.
153. See discussion supra Part I.
154. As Professor Macey has noted: "At various times, several states (in-
cluding Maine and Nevada) have attempted to attract incorporation business (and
the accompanying tax revenues and fees) by enacting more permissive statutes
that include incentives to incorporation. These states have had little success in
seizing Delaware's place at the forefront of the rechartering business." 1
JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAwS xxxix (1998).
155. See supra note 122.
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these statutes are not the only corporate law provisions that
are inefficient. Among other provisions, the sections of the
Model Act that grant shareholders dissenters' rights might be
characterized as inefficient.15 By allowing shareholders to in-
sist on a buy-out, the cost to the corporation of selling its assets
or amending its charter is increased. More fundamentally, any
mandatory provision in the corporate law is arguably ineffi-
cient. The relationship between shareholders and the corpora-
tion is essentially one of contract, the terms of which are set
forth in the articles of incorporation and the state corporate
codes. 57 Presumably, mandating terms in the corporate code is
unnecessary and inefficient, as the shareholders can bargain
for such terms as they prefer. If the state mandates a term,
and it is not a term that would have resulted from bargaining
between the corporation and the shareholders, then the state's
mandated term is inefficient. The persuasiveness of this ar-
gument is examined in the Conclusion below. In any case,
however, the continuation of mandatory terms in the Model
Act, Delaware corporate law, and the corporate codes of all
states amply demonstrates that inefficient corporate laws not
only exist, but in some instances are on the increase.' 8
Finally, even if Winter is correct that markets accurately
price corporate law, he overestimates the importance of the
market for corporate control. A key element of Winter's theory
is that corporations that choose an inefficient law will be sub-
ject to increased takeover risks. To avoid that eventuality, cor-
porate managers will choose an efficient law.'59 This theory
thus assumes an active, unencumbered market for takeovers,
an assumption that is simply counterfactual. Aside from the
effect of antitakeover laws, hostile takeovers are problematic.
156. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (1998).
157. For further development of this point, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991).
158. Among the mandatory provisions in the Model Business Corporation
Act are: only shares can vote (section 7.21); a quorum of directors must be at least
one-third (section 8.24(b)); shareholder action without a meeting must be by
unanimous consent (section 7.04); and, a staggered board must consist of at least
nine directors (section 8.06). See generally Carney, supra note 145, at 768-73
(setting forth a table showing mandatory provisions in the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act and the number of states adopting such provisions). Professor Carney
catalogued 30 mandatory rules and another 29 mandatory constraints on enabling
rules.
159. See Winter, supra note 18, at 289-90.
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The otherwise inefficient corporate statute must have a dra-
matic effect on the stock price, as the typical hostile takeover is
at a premium of twenty-five to thirty-five percent over mar-
ket.6 ° Not surprisingly, Winter did not cite, and I was unable
to find, a single instance of a corporation reincorporating in a
more shareholder-friendly state after a takeover-the scenario
that Winter so forcefully predicted.
Winter might respond that the differences among state
laws are not sufficiently great to warrant reincorporation. But
there are significant differences among the states. An alterna-
tive explanation is that even significant differences in law do
not translate into material differences in market effects. If this
is true, however, then two conclusions emerge. First, the pub-
lic policy that supports corporate law can be broader than eco-
nomic efficiency. If a statute that for other reasons seems ap-
propriate, such as a statute that grants dissenters' rights, does
not materially affect a corporation's market value, then legisla-
tures should adopt such a statute.'16  Second, if Delaware's
dominance is secure, and the states are not engaged in a "race
to the top," then we might wonder, as Cary did, whether corpo-
rate law adequately protects shareholder interests. This is the
subject of Part III, below.
III. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
The answer to this question-the one that so concerned
Cary-is not in federal regulation, as Cary believed, nor in the
market for corporate control, as Winter has argued. Rather,
the solution may be more direct: to increase shareholder de-
mocracy. To the extent that shareholders are disadvantaged
by provisions of state corporate law, their corporate charter or
by-laws, or, most importantly, by the unilateral action of their
board of directors,'62 they should be afforded the means by
which they can make changes. This, it turns out, is a matter
160. See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Capital: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 7 (1983).
161 See infra Conclusion for a more detailed development of this idea.
162. Unilateral actions might include the adoption of shareholder rights
plans, or poison pills, or the adoption of plans that create disparate voting rights.
See Moran v. Household Intl, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding a direc-
tor-created "flip-over poison pill").
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implicating both federal and state law, but one not much no-
ticed by those so earnestly engaged in the race debate.
Part of the reason that shareholder democracy is not more
warmly embraced is that, like citizen ballot initiatives, it is of-
ten abused. Many shareholder proposals relate to the pet proj-
ects or political agendas of various shareholders with small
stakes in the corporation. Quite often, shareholders propose
matters relating to political contributions, human rights, and
other social policies that are better left to the political arena.
Of equal importance, these measures never pass, because most
shareholders believe that they are not proper matters for
shareholder democracy.'63
At the same time, we are witnessing a quiet revolution re-
garding shareholder proposals that relate to corporate govern-
ance. Over the past several years, shareholders have been in-
creasingly active in making proposals to their fellow
shareholders and increasingly successful in achieving corporate
governance reform through such initiatives. For instance, in
1997 there were eighteen shareholder proposals recommending
to the board of directors that it redeem or allow shareholders to
vote on implementing or continuing poison pills. The average
vote in favor of these proposals was fifty-five percent.'64 In
1998, the number of such proposals had increased to twenty,
and the average affirmative vote increased to fifty-seven per-
cent.'65 By comparison, in 1992 there were about the same
number of proposals, but the affirmative vote was only forty-
163. For instance, of the 737 shareholder proposals tracked by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 1998, 261, or thirty-five percent, dealt
with social issues, 429 dealt with corporate governance proposals, and 47 were
classified as "overlapping proposals." The social issues included topics related to
equal employment, charitable contributions, and Northern Ireland, among others.
None passed and the average vote in favor of these proposals was about nine per-
cent. By comparison, corporate governance proposals received, on average, a
twenty-four percent favorable vote. See 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (Feb. 3,
1999).
164. See Kenneth A. Bertsch et al., SEC Release on Shareholder Proposal
Rule Reform Sparks Much Controversy, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. 7, 10
(1998).
165. See Summary of 1998 U.S. Shareholder Resolutions, 15 CORP.
GOVERNANCE BULL. SUPP. (Feb. 3, 1999).
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three percent.'66 Similar trends are apparent in other matters
of corporate governance of interest to shareholders.'67
Federal law has a role to play here, because the SEC over-
sees the proposal process, advising companies whether SEC
rules allow the company to omit a particular proposal from its
proxy statement.'" Under Rule 14a-8 (adopted under section
14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), a public company
must include shareholder proposals in its proxy statement un-
less the rules provide a specific exemption. 6 ' For instance, un-
der Rule 14a-8, a company need not include a proposal that
relates to the ordinary business of the company,170 nor one that
is not relevant to the company's business 7' or is improper un-
der state law.'72 If the SEC rules that a company must include
a particular shareholder proposal in its proxy statement, the
company may appeal the ruling to the federal courts, but it is
at a clear disadvantage, as the court will generally defer to the
SEC's expertise.
73
The latest development in this area has been the use by
shareholders of Rule 14a-8 to amend the corporation's bylaws,
thereby exercising a power that they generally share with di-
rectors under most corporate codes. 74 Unlike the earlier initia-
tives that merely requested the board to act, a bylaw amend-
ment, if approved by the shareholders, would be self-executing
and binding on the board. 7 ' The staff of the Commission has
ruled that it would treat shareholder proposals to amend the
166. See Shareholder Activism Continues to Thrive, 10 CORP. GOvERNANCE
BULL. 8 (May/June 1993).
167. For instance, the number of proposals to repeal classified boards had
increased from 35 in 1992 to 49 in 1998, while the vote in favor of the proposal
had increased from 32% in 1992 to 47% in 1998. Compare id. with Summary of
1998 U.S. Shareholder Resolutions, supra note 167.
168. See Peter J. Romeo and Richard I. Parrino, Reforming the Shareholder
Proposal Process, 1023 PLI/CORP. 239, 245-46 (1997).
169. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (1999).
170. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
171. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(5).
172. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
173. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 795 F.
Supp. 95, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed as moot and order vacated, 969
F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1992).
174. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a) (Supp. 1997).
175. See, e.g., Burr v. Burr Corp., 291 A.2d 409 (Del. Ch. 1972) (enforcing
stockholder-approved amendment to the bylaws authorizing holders of a majority
of the stock to fill newly created directorships at a time other than the annual
meeting).
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corporation's bylaws like any other shareholder proposals;
companies must include the proposals in their proxy state-
ments unless the proposal falls within one of the exemptions.'76
One of those exemptions is whether the proposal is a
proper matter of action for shareholders.77 This exemption
was at the heart of a closely watched Oklahoma case, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming
Cos.,17 where a shareholder proposed that the corporation in-
clude in its proxy statement a bylaw amendment that would
have repealed the corporation's poison pill and eliminated
management's ability to implement a similar provision in the
future without prior shareholder approval. Management re-
fused to include this proposal in the proxy statement, arguing
that the decision of whether or not to institute or repeal a poi-
son pill is a purely management decision. Shareholders, they
argued, have no authority under state law to interfere with this
aspect of corporate governance. The federal district court in
Oklahoma, in a 1997 ruling from the bench, ordered Fleming to
include the proposal. Fleming appealed the ruling to the Tenth
Circuit, which certified the matter to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, asking whether, under Oklahoma state law, (a) the
board of directors has exclusive authority to create and imple-
ment poison pill plans, and (b) whether a shareholder proposal
may require that poison pill plans be submitted to a vote of
shareholders. In a decision handed down in January of 1999,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in favor of the sharehold-
ers, deciding that the board's authority was not exclusive and
the shareholder proposal was a proper avenue for shareholders
to seek amendments to the corporate bylaws.
v9
This decision strikes at the very heart of the relationship
between shareholders and directors and at the race debate.
Fleming argued that the corporate code empowered the board,
not shareholders, to implement and redeem poison pills. 80 It
thus argued, in effect, that the corporate code empowered the
176. See, e.g., Letter from General DataComm Industries, Inc. to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (Oct. 27, 1998) (available in 1998 WL 883796
(SEC)) (regarding the SEC's no-action letter).
177. See § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
178. 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999).
179. See id. at 913.
180. See id. at 910.
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board, not the shareholders, to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation. The Oklahoma court was unconvinced.
Some critics of the Fleming decision have questioned
whether Delaware would follow it,'8' citing Quickturn Design
Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc.'82 In that 1999 decision,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board of directors
could not adopt a poison pill plan that limited the ability of fu-
ture boards to repeal the plan, thereby setting aside a so-called
"delayed redemption" provision."' The court reasoned that an
elected board of directors must have full power to manage and
direct the business and affairs of the corporation." 4 Arguably,
the bylaw provision approved in Fleming infringes upon this
authority, but the context is so different that citing Quickturn
as inconsistent with Fleming borders on cynicism. In Quick-
turn, the court overturned the attempt by the board of directors
to affect the authority of future boards, thereby limiting a dra-
conian antitakeover measure. In Fleming, the Oklahoma court
upheld the action of the shareholders to limit the authority of
the board of directors. It is a decision that limits the likelihood
of a draconian antitakeover measure. The decisions are per-
fectly consistent with one another to the extent that they both
support the removal of barriers in the market for corporate
control.
If a Delaware court were to reject Fleming, then, at least
on one level, it would be saying that shareholders are incapable
of acting in their own best interests, a proposition that is at
odds with the philosophy underlying Quickturn and the Dela-
ware corporate code itself. Under the corporate code, only di-
rectors are limited in the ability to adopt, amend, or repeal by-
laws. Once the corporation issues shares, the power to adopt,
amend, or repeal bylaws rests exclusively with shareholders,
unless the articles also give this power to directors. 185 Even if
181. See, e.g., Michael D. Goldman, Fleming Must Be Read Narrowly, 21
BANK AND CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 1102 (1999) (providing a symposium on
this issue); Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights
Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835 (1998) (arguing for the enforceability of such by-
law amendments); Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Robert J. Steam, Jr., Shareholder
By-Laws Requiring Boards of Directors to Dismantle Rights Plans Are Unlikely to
Survive Scrutiny Under Delaware Law, 54 BUS. LAW. 607 (1999).
182. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
183. See id. at 1291.
184. See id.
185. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1998).
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the articles confer upon directors the power to adopt, amend or
repeal bylaws, however, the shareholders continue to have the
power undiminished.'86 The Delaware code thus expresses a
preference for shareholder rulemaking in the corporate area.
Finally, Fleming is a decision that is consistent with eco-
nomic efficiency, a goal that Justice Veasey, the Chief Justice
of the Delaware Supreme Court, has extolled in speeches and
articles."' Just as investors value corporate governance fea-
tures in assessing a company's value, they would only vote for
corporate governance proposals that enhance the value of their
investment. If one is willing to trust shareholders on the in-
vestment side, then one must trust them even more so on the
voting side. An investor may purchase shares despite dissatis-
faction with one or more terms of governance, but a rational
investor will not vote for a discrete proposal that disadvantages
his or her investment.
In any event, shareholder democracy holds the key to the
future of corporate law. So long as shareholders can undo
value-decreasing corporate governance structures, or imple-
ment value-enhancing provisions, they can minimize the im-
pact of statutory law. Corporate law simply will matter far less
if investors directly influence corporate law at the corporate
ballot box and not just indirectly with their investment prefer-
ences. State legislators who truly wish to enact an efficient law
should protect shareholder democracy.
CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES.
Beyond protecting shareholder democracy, however, is
there any role for state legislators? This question provides an-
other way to characterize the Winter/Cary debate. When Win-
ter and others argue that investors can price the terms of cor-
porate governance,' they are also saying that corporate codes
should be enabling, not mandatory. That is, corporate codes
should not mandate anything in the relationship between
shareholders and corporate managers; what investors and
managers decide upon on their own is likely to be more efficient
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Deci-
sionmaking in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681 (1998).
188. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 157, at 1431 ("The
[stock] price reflects the effects, good or bad, of corporate law.").
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than anything that state bureaucrats can devise. After all, the
argument goes, investors will do a better job than bureaucrats
because investors are putting their own funds at risk, while the
bureaucrats are not.
189
This sounds very nice. Why not let private parties order
their affairs in any way that they see fit? After all, is there any
real public interest involved here? If the shareholders of, say,
XYZ, Inc., suffer a loss because their managers diverted corpo-
rate opportunities to themselves, and their corporate charter
permitted such conduct, that is a problem for the XYZ share-
holders, who assumed that risk when they made the invest-
ment, but it is not a problem for anyone else. Perhaps the
shareholders received some other concession, such as a charter
provision that limited executive compensation in some novel
way. If that was the deal the XYZ shareholders made, then we
ought to respect their freedom to contract in any way they see
fit.
190
This view is very popular in law and economic circles. In
fact, it is a Holy Grail among its adherents.1 9' Like other neat
theories, however, this one has its problems. For starters, it
rests on an assumption about the world that does not square
with common observations. As a society, we recognize that
people sometimes take advantage of other people and that, in
egregious cases, it is proper to provide a means to redress such
wrongs. The common law simply could not live with an unfet-
tered freedom of contract because of the abuses that might oc-
cur. As a result, the law either provides relief ex post or pro-
hibits the offending conduct ex ante. As it is probably more
efficient to establish minimum standards ex ante than make ad
hoc judgments ex post, corporate law has opted for at least
some protective provisions. Therefore, corporate law provides
that directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corpora-
tion and cannot contract out of this duty.
Second, the "Holy Grail" economic efficiency analysis as-
sumes that markets can accurately price the value of all terms
189. See id.
190. See J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Part-
nerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
439 (1997) (arguing that, in the partnership context, parties ought to be able to
waive all fiduciary duties).
191. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
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of corporate governance, but there is evidence that markets do
not do a particularly good job of valuing even significant terms
of corporate governance. 92 Imagine, then, how fanciful it is to
think that the market is valuing the most obscure risks. For
instance, until recent amendments to the Colorado corporate
code, the directors of a Colorado corporation could, in theory,
eliminate minority shareholders without compensation for
their shares through a reverse stock split. Several years ago, a
Colorado corporation apparently did just that.'93 The share-
holders approved a reorganization in which each 10,000 shares
that a shareholder held would be converted into one share. No
fractional shares were to be issued. If a shareholder held less
than 10,000 shares, he would receive scrip entitling him to a
share if he could assemble scrip for 10,000 shares. If he failed
to do so by a specified date, the scrip became void. The large
shareholders approved the split and consolidated their owner-
ship of the company, while the small shareholders were left
holding scrip of questionable value. The Colorado code neither
prohibited this transaction nor required compensation for the
adversely affected shareholders. While that transaction may
have represented a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors,
the minority shareholders would have to litigate to establish
their right to relief.'94
In 1994, the Colorado legislature amended the code to pro-
vide that in this situation shareholders holding scrip are enti-
tled to be paid the fair value for the fractional interest repre-
sented by the scrip. s' We might ask whether, when this
corporation first issued stock to the public, the markets priced
the possibility of an investor being squeezed out of the corpora-
tion without compensation. There may be no way to test this
hypothesis, but is it really necessary to do so? Is not the legis-
lative solution of requiring fair compensation a better solution
than litigation on the question of breach of fiduciary duty? It is
192. See Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeter-
minacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to 'Changes' in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 551 (1987) (finding no statistically significant market reaction to any of
seven significant Delaware cases related to corporate governance).
193. The author learned of the reverse split after shareholders who were ad-
versely impacted by it contacted him for an opinion on whether it conformed with
Colorado's corporate law. To his knowledge, the action was never litigated.
194. C.f. Goldman v. Union Bank & Trust, 765 P.2d 638 (Colo. App. 1988)
(breach of fiduciary duty not established).
195. See COLO. Bus. CORP. ACT, § 7-113-102(2.5) (1999).
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fairer and cleaner than the messy uncertainty of litigation, and
a legitimate action for a legislature to take.
Needless to say, the corporation codes contain other in-
stances of reasonable legislative responses to perceived injus-
tices. 96 This is the role that we expect of legislatures, and the
corporate law should be no exception. In areas of potential
abuse of minority shareholders, legislatures should continue to
consider and enact reasonable protective provisions. Legisla-
tures might regard the relationship between shareholders and
directors as indeed one of contract, but like other contracts, one
in which unconscionable bargains are not enforceable. Manda-
tory terms of corporate codes are best understood in that light:
they ought to mandate terms which, if not present in the "con-
tract," might give rise to an unconscionable result, as in the
Colorado case discussed above. This test suggests that many, if
not most, mandatory terms are unnecessary. On the other
hand, this test leaves an important role for legislatures to play
in what might otherwise be thought to be a matter of private
contracting, to express the conscience of the community.
196. This instinct provides an explanation for dissenters' rights, among
other provisions.
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